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Abstract: A theory of intergenerational justice consists in the study of the moral and political status of the 
relations between present and past or future people, more specifically, of the obligations and entitlements 
they can potentially generate. The challenges that justify talking about responsibilities between 
generations are myriad (e.g., the amount of public debt that is fair to incur; the funding of future pensions; 
reparations for past wrongs; climate change). And the disputes they prompt can focus on the past just as 
much as on the present, even though the fact that the human species has reached a state of technological 
progress that enables it to have an irredeemable impact on the planet and perhaps even endanger future 
human existence tends to make concerns about the future more pressing. Debates on intergenerational 
justice are twofold. The first revolves around the issue of whether claims of justice across generations 
whose members' lifetimes do not necessarily overlap could be justified. And the second revolves around 
the specific conception of justice in play, that is, around the nature of the standard that must be applied as 
well as around the identification of the contents of the duties that present generations supposedly have 
vis‐à‐vis past or future generations. This survey article depicts the conceptual and argumentative 
framework in which these debates are set. It aims to outline certain of the main features shared by the 
most influential contemporary theories of intergenerational justice, and the problems inherent in them. It 
concludes by suggesting that, even though the idea of succeeding generations is merely an abstraction, 
there are specific empirical states of affairs that require different theoretical responses to intergenerational 
justice. 
1. Introduction 
A theory of intergenerational justice consists in the study of the moral and political 
status of the relations between present and past or future people, more specifically, of 
the obligations and entitlements they can potentially generate. Within such a frame of 
reference, past or future generations might have legitimate claims or rights against 
present generations, who in turn might have correlative responsibilities or duties 
towards past or future generations. 





The challenges that justify talking about responsibilities between generations are 
myriad. They comprise the amount of public debt that is fair to incur; the enactment of 
long-standing legal rules in constitutional frameworks; the proper funding for future 
pensions; reparations for past wrongs; the social response to high unemployment rates 
among young people; the combat against climate change; etc. And the disputes they 
prompt can focus on the past just as much as on the present. However, the fact that the 
human species has reached a state of technological progress that enables it to have an 
irredeemable impact on the planet (thus inaugurating a new geological era called the 
Anthropocene) and perhaps even endanger future human existence tends to make 
concerns about the future more pressing. 
This survey article depicts the conceptual and argumentative framework in 
which debates on intergenerational justice are set. It aims to outline some of the main 
features shared by the most influential contemporary theories of intergenerational 
justice, and the problems inherent in them. It concludes by suggesting that, even though 
the idea of succeeding generations is merely an abstraction, there are specific empirical 
states of affairs that require different theoretical responses to intergenerational justice. 
 
2. Is There a Basis for Intergenerational Justice? 
A first debate on intergenerational justice revolves around the issue of whether claims of 
justice across generations whose members’ lifetimes do not necessarily overlap1 could 
be justified. It expresses a frame of reference with three basic characteristics. 
(i) Moral status of non-overlapping generations. The underlying conception of 
time encompasses the past (determinism), the present (actuality) and the future 
(non-determinism). Intergenerational justice applies to transgenerational 
communities, that is, communities whose different generations do not 
necessarily coexist in a particular moment; but it is addressed specifically to 
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 Non-simultaneity is not a necessary condition of intergenerational justice. However, the relations 
between non-simultaneous moral agents are different from the relations between simultaneous moral 
agents. Depending on the definition of ‘generation’, justice is conceivable either between the present and 
past or future generations (intertemporal generations) or between the young and the old (temporal 
generations) (Tremmel 2009, 4). Justice between temporal generations can be tackled by general theories 
of justice, which are theories of intragenerational justice; but justice between intertemporal generations 
extends beyond the scope of general theories of justice, thus bringing about theories of intergenerational 
justice. 





members of present generations, who are required to take into consideration the 
moral status of members of past and future generations. 
(ii) Non-reciprocity between non-overlapping generations. There is neither 
mutual cooperation nor any kind of exchanges between individuals belonging to 
non-simultaneous generations. 
(iii) Asymmetry in power-relations between non-overlapping generations. 
Requirements of intergenerational justice involve the intention of balancing what 
seems to be an unsurpassable power of present generations vis-à-vis past or 
future generations. However, the means of diminishing this asymmetry are 
fundamentally different, given that present generations may be said to exercise 
power over future generations but not over past ones. Whereas intergenerational 
justice applied to the relations between present and future generations usually 
concerns a proper distribution of goods and a respect for the (possible) rights of 
future people, intergenerational justice applied to the relations between present 





Scepticism about theories of justice focused exclusively on intergenerational 
relations rejects that the aforementioned characteristics cannot be met by standard 
theories of justice
3
, especially with regard to arguments about the future (rather than the 
past) to support special kinds of moral responsibilities upon present generations. In the 
present-future relation, scepticism consists in a refusal to commit to the idea that there is 
such a thing as obligations in the present to future people in the sense that such 
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 The problem of moral reparation for past actions is expressed chiefly in debates about the rights of 
present people to receive compensation for wrongs committed against their ancestors, especially with 
regard to the victims of slavery and of the Holocaust. But the past may also be important when identifying 
a just distribution of goods in the present, such as when CO2 emissions of the past determine the effective 
reduction rates to be enforced in the present (Gosseries 2004). 
3
 Scepticism can be traced back to Thomas Jefferson’s dictum that ‘the earth belongs in usufruct to the 
living’ (Jefferson 2004, 599). Jefferson’s theses were expounded in correspondence with James Madison 
and John Wayles Eppes about constitutional revisions and the limits of public debt, and they were shared 
by Thomas Paine and other authors sympathetic to the ideals of the French Revolution (for instance, 
article 6 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen adopted by the French constitution 
of 1793 stated that ‘One generation cannot submit the future generations to its laws’). The main 
counterarguments have their origin in Edmund Burke, for whom society is a ‘partnership not only 
between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to 
be born’ (Burke 1962, 140). 





obligations can be explained in terms of the specific interests or even correlative rights 
that future persons may have against persons in the present. 
The main source of scepticism is the ‘non-identity problem’ developed by 
Thomas Schwartz (1978), Robert Merrihew Adams (1979), Gregory Kavka (1981), and, 
most forcefully, Derek Parfit (1987). The problem depends upon the claim that the 
decisions that currently living people make count as necessary conditions not merely of 
the conditions in which certain people will live in the future but also of their very 
existence. Derek Parfit’s reasoning is as follows: which particular future persons will 
exist is dependent on when their procreation takes place; even if we could suppose that 
following certain actions or policies would make future persons worse off, the fact 
remains that the people born as a result of these actions or policies would not have been 
born at all if an alternative action or policy had been adopted; therefore, assuming they 
have lives worth living, they are not harmed by those actions or policies (Parfit 1987, 
351-379). 
The contingency of future people upon decisions made by present people raises 
doubts about the possibility of the former having rights (or just claims) that can be 
violated by the latter. Since present persons’ allegedly harmful actions or policies will 
also influence the identity of future persons, there is a sense in which future persons 
could not meaningfully be said to be harmed, and even less wronged. And, if persons 
cannot be harmed, what would rights protect them against?  
Two further arguments support this sceptical position. The first is the 
‘nonexistence’ argument (De George 1981; Macklin 1981; Beckerman 2006), which 
sustains that future persons cannot have rights and reasonable claims in the present 
since they do not exist. The second is the ‘no-satisfaction’ argument (De George 1981; 
Beckerman and Pasek 2001), according to which future persons cannot have a right to 
resources that do not exist at the time of their existence because such a right could not, 
in principle, be satisfied. 
Reactions to these arguments are myriad. The first is denial, consisting of two 
different strategies: the ‘concessional view’ (Elliot 1989; Schlossberger 2008)4, which 
states that rights can exist presently without a holder because they correlate with present 
                                                          
4
 Also called ‘the meinongian view’ (Routley and Routley 1977). Its conceptual frame of reference 
derives from Feinberg (1974). 





duties, and its present existence is contingent on the future existence of some person 
who will then be the holder of the right;
5
 and the ‘constitutive view’, which states that a 
certain course of action might involve the creation of rights that would probably be 
violated in the future, that is, a present action that may be a cause for a legitimate 
complaint is constitutive of a future right (Sterba 1980; Woodward 1986; Smolkin 
1999). 
The second reaction is acceptance, according to which it is not possible to 
genuinely harm persons who depend on present choices for their very existence nor is it 
possible to violate rights that never actually exist (Heyd 1992). There are two kinds of 
moral replies that embrace such sceptic arguments. The first states that they do not have 
to pose a moral problem since even what seems like the most implausible conclusion 
regarding possible future persons (for instance, that it is not morally wrong to conceive 
a blind child even if the same agents could have conceived a sighted child) can be more 
consonant with common-sense morality than one might think (Boonin 2014). The 
second kind of reply takes the future out of the equation in order to preserve rights-talk. 
Such transitive theories conceive of intergenerational justice in terms of rights of living 
people, whether they are adults with present interests in future states of affairs (Mazor 
2010), our children or other children born in our lifetime (Gheaus 2016), any presently 
existing person (Delattre 1972), or any member of temporally neighbouring generations 
that will at least at some point in the future have a chance of overlapping (Gosseries 
2008). 
A third kind of reaction is to attack the sceptic arguments’ underlying 
metaphysics of time and modality. Rather than thinking of duration as a three-point 
linear order of past, present and future, these reactions talk about identity in terms of an 
eternalist metaphysics of time in which all moments are actual (Griffith 2017) or about 
the need for acknowledging alternative accounts of modality encompassing counterpart 
theory in which possible worlds are equally actual in their own way (Wrigley 2012). 
The advantage of such reactions is that they prevent a future person from measuring 
violation of her rights against nonexistence – her rights exist in her world and can be 
compared with other existing rights in other temporal or possible worlds. 
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 A milder version of the concessional view claims that present moral agents have a capacity of foresight 
(Vanderheiden 2006) or of developing prospective scenarios (Schuessler 2016) in which future rights are 
to be violated or cannot be waived. 





A fourth kind of reaction is to attack the language of rights of future persons, 
either by derogating or by disconnecting them from personal identity. Derogation 
follows from a conception of rights inherent in personal identity. If those particular 
future persons that supposedly will be harmed by present actions will never come to 
exist, their artificial rights can never justify or be correlatives with present duties. The 
language of rights seems therefore unfit for the context of moral relations between non-
overlapping generations; instead, it should be replaced by principles establishing that 
something is wrong either in view of impersonal effects (Parfit 1987
6
; Brock 1995; 
Buchanan et al. 2000) or because it contradicts the agents’ reasons, attitudes or 
intentions (Wasserman 2005). 
Still, rights terminology can be preserved by reducing personal identity to a 
contingent aspect of a right. Rights are then attributed to types, of which particular 
future persons will be mere tokens (Fieser 1992; Herstein 2009; Unruh 2016). There are 
different levels of abstraction involved in this strategy. A first level interprets the 
subjects of certain rights to be social roles (Baier 1981) or status-functions (Pletcher 
1981) rather than actual persons: for instance, a teacher may be said to have certain 
duties to future students, even though the latter are indeterminate in their particular 
identities; it is in the light of their role or status-function that they can be attributed 
rights without contradiction. A second level of abstraction prefers to think of the 
subjects of rights in terms of human collectives. Mostly, such collectives are 
generations – regardless of who the actual future persons will be, intergenerational 
rights are group rights, that is, generational rights in which the interests protected do not 
depend upon knowing the individuals (or the numbers) that may exist in any given 
future generation (Weiss 1990; Kramer 2001; Brännmark 2016; Schuessler 2016). A 
third level of abstraction attributes rights to future persons because they will share those 
properties of being human that require present persons to relate morally to them as 
fellow humans. Such rights are ‘generic rights’, in accordance with Alan Gewirth’s 
principle of generic consistency (Gewirth 1978). Their generic nature makes duties 
independent of the existence of particular future persons (Beyleveld et al. 2015). 
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 On a posthumously published work, however, Parfit came to accept that the non-identity problem could 
be overcome by what he called a ‘wide person-affecting principle’, according to which one of two 
outcomes is worse if it benefits people less than the other outcome would have (Parfit 2017). 





A fifth kind of reaction rejects the person-affecting morality inherent in the non-
identity problem. This involves either separating wronging from harming (Kumar 2003) 
or opposing Parfit’s worse-off argument. Negative responses to the worse-off argument 
are twofold. It can be rejected on the basis that harming someone does not depend upon 
a comparative analysis but can be determined absolutely, for instance by assessing 
whether someone was caused to be simply in a ‘bad state’ (Benatar 2006; Harman 2009, 
137). Or it can be reinterpreted in the sense of a non-counterfactual account that 
ascribes harm not by comparing a person’s current condition with that in which she 
would otherwise have been if not for the allegedly harmful action, but rather with how 
she ought to be regardless of the harm done (Hanser 1990; Shiffrin 1999; McMahan 
2001; Rivera-Lopez 2009). 
All these arguments and counterarguments frame an ongoing debate. It is a 
mistake to lessen it to a mere theoretical discussion without practical significance since 
it involves a clarification of the nature of the normative instruments that might be 
impending on present persons in the context of intergenerational justice. Without such a 
clarification, it remains plausible that many authors are not disagreeing but rather 
talking past each other. 
 
3. What is the Standard of Intergenerational Justice? 
The second major debate on intergenerational justice revolves around the specific 
conception of justice in play, that is, around the nature of the standard that must be 
applied as well as around the identification of the contents of the duties that present 
generations supposedly have vis-à-vis past or future generations. Different conceptions 
of intergenerational justice conflict over how one should think about justice in the 
context of relations between non-necessarily-overlapping generations. This debate 
differs from conflicting understandings of the contours of justice, that is, conflicting 
understandings of which sorts of things are just and which are unjust. The debate on 
conceptions is prior to any kind of value judgement to particular cases.  
In general, different conceptions of intergenerational justice share a normative 
frame of reference establishing a prohibition of depletion of those resources that are 
available to present generations, that is, the basket of capital and goods (not only 





physical, but also technological, institutional, environmental, cultural, relational) that 
can be used or passed on to subsequent generations. The choice between depletion and 
conservation acts as a borderline case of justice between non-overlapping generations. 
But that does not imply necessarily the equivalence between depletion and injustice, 
given that different standards may evaluate depletion differently. In less borderline 
circumstances, there might be instances in which savings are obligatory and instances in 
which present generations are required to invest for the benefit of succeeding 
generations. Different theories with different standards provide different moral 
outcomes. 
A commutative standard establishes reciprocity: justice comes about in the 
equilibrium between that which is received and that which is transmitted, regardless of 
the size of the basket. With regard to non-necessarily-overlapping generations, direct 
reciprocity between present and past members is not possible, given that past 
generations cannot be active recipients. That does not entail necessarily the dissolution 
of duties grounded on reciprocity because, even though the creditor generation no 
longer exists in the present, the debtor generation does. Reciprocity can still be 
conceived of in terms of rights that are transmitted to descendants; but since the 
immediate heirs to such rights are members of the debtor generation, those same rights 
are transmitted to the subsequent descendants. Commutative standards in 
intergenerational relations hence express indirect reciprocity: each generation owes 
something to the succeeding generations because it received something from previous 
generations (Barry 1989; Shalit 1995; Wade-Benzoni 2002; McCormick 2009). There is 
thus a set of chain duties connecting non-contemporary generations. Not only are there 
duties to future generations, but those duties are justified in the light of a relationship 
with the past. In addition, the equal proportion between what has been received and 
what is rewarded suggests that present generations will have to leave to the next 
generations something at least equivalent to what they received from previous ones. 
This requires a prohibition of dissavings and of depletion. What is important is that the 
intertemporal balance is maintained between generations with regard to resources that 
can be passed on. 
An aggregative standard, on the other hand, focuses on the size of the basket of 
available resources. Intergenerational justice comes about whenever a society’s overall 
resources (such as welfare and capital) can be measured progressively throughout 





different times encompassing successive generations. Justice is determined from a 
principle aiming at the maximization of the size of the basket in one transgenerational 
community (Liedekerke and Lauwers 1997; Asheim and Buchholz 2007). The effects of 
actions undertaken (or of rules adopted) by members of present generations with the 
purpose of maximizing the available resources help to determine whether those actions 
are just or not.  
An exclusively aggregative standard suggests that the most disadvantaged 
generations (those that are still at an early stage of the process of aggregate 
accumulation) will have to make the greatest sacrifices in order to accrue a basket of 
capital and goods which will be used by subsequent generations. This seems to equate 
justice with effectiveness. However, aggregative standards can be measured 
proportionately. For instance, equality (e.g. of opportunities, of power, of wealth, of 
happiness) might be a means of guaranteeing greater efficiency of well-being, in which 
case the general distribution is not only aggregative (total or average) but chiefly 
equitable of the greatest possible aggregation. Aggregative standards do not sentence 
necessarily the less advantaged generations to follow the prohibition of dissavings in a 
sacrificial manner. Rather, the aggregate of welfare and capital measured over various 
generations is never quantitatively closed since the community extends over time, and 
each new generation supposes the future existence of another generation that will 
integrate that same aggregate; the aggregate provisionally counted in the present 
includes fixed elements (the number of members of present and past generations) and 
possible elements (the indefinite estimate of members of future generations), and it is 
conceivable that there is a primacy of fixed elements to the detriment of possible 
elements when measuring the whole. An aggregative standard consists mostly in a 
principle of optimization that takes into account all members of a transgenerational 
community; since future members cannot be quantitatively determined in the aggregate, 
the prohibition of dissavings cannot be absolute as to undermine the maximization of 
the welfare and capital available to present generations. 
Contrariwise, a distributive standard emphasizes the means by which available 
resources are apportioned to the different members of society. The standard follows a 
specific pattern in the distribution of capital and goods throughout time, even if the 
basket fails to be maximized and regardless of the use given to those resources in the 





past. There are different kinds of distributive theories of intergenerational justice since 
they adopt different standards. 
A strict egalitarian stance qualifies as unjust any exercise of individual liberties 
that might leave future generations in unequal conditions of access to the available 
resources, even if future people are recognized as having rights to them. A less strict 
version of egalitarianism favours a priority view that benefits persons who are worse off 
even if that produces further social and economic inequalities between people living in 
the same or in different times. It is not equality as such that justifies positive 
discrimination in favour of those who are less privileged without it, but rather the need 
to include in morality a willingness to improve the conditions of the underprivileged. 
Both kinds of standards are comparative. This poses problems concerning who 
and what is to be compared. With regard to whom, one possible answer is that present 
generations have the obligation to ensure that members of future generations are not left 
worse off than the remaining members of their (future) society; justice aims at 
diminishing (intragenerational) inequality in future societies (Sher 1979). Another 
possible answer involves comparing non-simultaneous generations: obligations that 
present generations might have to future generations require that future persons inherit 
welfare conditions that are not worse or less than those available to present persons 
(Barry 1999). With regard to what is compared, different answers (life expectancy? 
lifestyle? health? wealth? happiness?) bring about different theories of intergenerational 
justice: some compare the levels of welfare available to all members of a 
transgenerational society across different times (Honderich 1976; Layard 2005); others 
focus on the basic structural resources that support each generation’s society (Rawls 
1971); others emphasize fundamental individual capabilities to achieve outcomes in 
accordance with a valuable lifestyle (Sen 1999; Page 2007; Watene 2013); and others 
measure equality in the light of a scale encompassing both individual opportunities free 
from obstacles and minimum collective standards of welfare (Cohen 2011). 
Non-comparative standards avoid such problems. They focus on a specific 
threshold beneath which no moral agent can fall, regardless of other agents’ positions 
(Frankfurt 1987). Sufficientarian standards of this sort establish duties for the creation 
of conditions in which as many people as possible have enough resources to pursue the 
aims and aspirations they affirm. Like prioritarianism, sufficientarianism accepts 





unequal outcomes of the distribution of capital and goods as just; and it also expresses 
moral principles in favour of the underprivileged. However, unlike prioritarianism, it 
defines the threshold between privileged and underprivileged as free access to those 
resources that are sufficient in order to achieve a specific state of affairs (economically, 
politically, culturally, etc.); and it applies the priority view solely to those persons 
underneath such a threshold, independently of the time they live in (Crisp 2003; Benbaji 
2005; Huseby 2010; Shields 2012). Those that stand above the threshold can claim no 




There have been attempts to conceive of intergenerational justice in terms of 
mixed standards. Mostly, they regard intergenerational justice as an equilibrium 
between a specific kind of equality and individual liberty. 
For communitarian views, individuals are born into pre-existing communities 
whose preservation over time makes them transgenerational in kind. Individuals have 
responsibilities in transgenerational communities if they share ‘lifetime-transcending 
interests’ (Thompson 2009), that is, interests that have as their subject matter events, 
objects, or states of affairs that pre-exist or transcend a member’s lifetime. These special 
interests play an important role in the lives of individuals and in the formation of their 
identities; but, more importantly, their existence makes it likely that those who have 
them will be inclined to make demands on their successors. Responsibilities towards 
non-overlapping generations are part of the strategy for the preservation of the cultural 
identity of communities – they constitute a theory of intergenerational justice only if 
derived from this idea of ‘transtemporal’ group identity. In this sense, there are no 
generational privileges established by temporal conditions. Present generations are 
simply the actualization of community life, and the available resources belong to the 
community as a whole over time. 
Libertarian perspectives are methodologically different. Their reference is no 
longer the individual in the community, but the individual before the community, with 
her own personal freedom including self-ownership and a moral power to appropriate 
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 The most prominent defence of sufficientarianism in intergenerational relations goes back to the 
(normative) definition of ‘sustainable development’ present in Our Common Future (also known as the 
Brundtland Report), published in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
according to which development is sustainable if it does not compromise the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs. 





unowned external resources. Within such framework, individual liberty requires some 
sort of ‘transtemporal’ protection achieved only by the enforcement of a proviso 
requiring ‘at least where there is enough and as good left for others’ (Locke 1988, §27). 
This implies a formulation of the following type: ‘the continued legitimacy of private 
ownership from the standpoint of self-ownership depends on each successive generation 
obtaining the equivalent of a per capita share of unimproved, undegraded land’ 
(Arneson 1991, 53); or ‘no individual may degrade or use up more than her per capita 
share of natural resources without sustainable offsetting compensation’ (Steiner and 
Vallentyne 2009, 63). The libertarian approach focuses on knowing to what extent one’s 
existence deprives someone else of something she could otherwise have benefited from; 
the Lockean proviso functions as a guardian of individual liberty across generations. 
Equality has a role to play in this strategy insofar as it refers to equal rights to resources 
and to an equal treatment of individuals with respect to their rights, never to an equal 
distribution of resources or property. The Lockean proviso is the standard for 
guaranteeing such equality – an equality of the formal conditions of access to resources 
not necessarily transformed. Ultimately, the restoration of the conditions of originality 
boils down to the question of each individual leaving a condition of freedom to be at 
least identical to that which would have existed had she not existed. It is, after all, a 
demand to equalize (in a formal sense) freedom understood as the absence of unjustified 
restrictions on the action of individuals. 
John Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism suggests a different setting. In the original 
position, in which every generation is represented, the veil of ignorance prevents 
contracting parties from knowing to which generation they will belong. This leads them 
to determine a ‘just savings rate’. According to Rawls, intergenerational relations 
change according to different stages of social development. In an accumulation stage, 
present generations are bound by a savings principle to the extent that it is necessary to 
enable subsequent generations to stay above a minimum threshold of justice; the 
savings principle would include preserving the gains of culture and civilization, 
maintaining fair institutions and putting aside a suitable amount of investment in order 
to guarantee a sustainable and just basic structure over time (Rawls 1971, 254). In a 
later stage of stability, where fair institutions are sufficiently established, the savings 
principle is substituted by an obligation to leave to future generations at least the 





equivalent of what present generations received from the previous generation (Rawls 
1971, 257). 
The just savings principle in the accumulation stage is justified by the need to 
establish fair institutions that protect the basic freedoms of all individuals (e.g. physical 
integrity, freedom of expression, etc.). Even though the accumulation stage has the 
purpose of improving the social and economic conditions of the most disadvantaged 
individuals, the stability stage in a fairly structured society cannot be achieved by 
violating basic freedoms. Rather, individuals from different generations agree on the 
principles of justice
8
 ensuring that the members of each generation are integrated into a 
basic structure of society that protects their most fundamental rights. 
 
4. Empirical changes as theoretical challenges 
Theories of intergenerational justice lead to different normative conclusions even 
without addressing the specific characteristics of the basket that constitutes the 
substance of intergenerational responsibilities (e.g. retirement  pensions, industrial 
waste, public debt interests, military technology, mass migrations, scarcity of 
environmental and food resources, unemployment rates, normative frameworks for 
problems of bioethics such as abortion, reproduction scenarios, legal wrongful life 




 Firstly, there are several ways of understanding transhistoricity with regard to 
the legitimate usage of available resources. For instance, commutative theories 
reproduce the instruments of inheritance and restitution. Present generations inherit 
resources from their ancestors, and in turn are obliged to give back what they received, 
this time to the following generation which also inherits those resources. The relations 
between moral agents and the available resources resemble property relations, and the 
transmission of resources from one generation to the next mirrors a historical timeline. 
                                                          
8
 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls justifies the just savings principles by means of what he calls a 
‘motivational assumption’ according to which individuals have a natural motive of care for their 
descendants (Rawls 1971, 128-9). In his later Political Liberalism, however, he shows reservations about 
the motivational assumption and instead claims that contractors simply agree to principles of savings that 
they want all previous generations to have followed (Rawls 1993, 273-4). 
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 For the thesis that there can be no transhistorical theory of justice and therefore no valid theory of 
intergenerational justice either, see Ball (1985). 





In the opposite sense, the popular saying (often presented as an ancient Indian proverb) 
‘We do not inherit the earth from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children’ makes 
use of a different setting. It reproduces the instruments of loans rather than of 
inheritances and this entails, on the one hand, that the relations between present persons 
and the available resources does not resemble property relations but rather the mere 
possession of that which belongs to other persons; and, on the other hand, that the 
timeline referred to is psychological rather than historical since the loan mirrors the 
course of memory, backwards, from a generation of proprietors that never actually 
comes into existence because it is always in the future. A third kind of setting can be 
found in Hans Jonas’ theory of moral responsibility, according to which ethics must 
become non-anthropocentric in order to ensure the survival of the planet and of all life 
therein (Jonas 1979). According to Jonas, time in intergenerational relations should be 
regarded as cosmic rather than simply historical or psychological, since only then will 
humans understand that their relation with the available resources resembles neither 
property nor loans but is instead a relation of identity. The imperative of responsibility 
involves caring for available resources as one cares for oneself, not merely in order to 
act justly towards succeeding generations but in order to ensure the survival of the 
human species.
10
 In the end, the fact that the relations between present generations and 
available resources are framed by different conceptions of time determines varied 
theoretical responses. 
Secondly, the idea of succeeding generations is merely an abstraction (Barry 
1977) since it assumes that one entire group of persons departs as another arrives on the 
scene, whereas population replacement is a continuous process. This makes it difficult 
to apply standards of intergenerational justice in accordance with the threefold division 
of generations. For nontransitive theories distinguishing between three generations, G1 
(the past), G2 (the present), and G3 (the future), the line between them (the frontier 
between simultaneity and non-simultaneity) may not be easily drawn. For instance, is a 
foetus likely to be born tomorrow a member of G3 on equal terms with persons who 
will be born in 100 years? Or is she a rights-holder of G2 with a special status? 
Similarly, transitive theories distinguishing between G1 (the oldest cohort), G2 (the 
middle-one) and G3 (the youngest one), in which at least two of them overlap, faces 
suchlike problems: is a baby born today a member of G2 or G3? Or of both? Is she 
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mainly a duty-bearer or a right-holder in an intergenerational context? Hard cases 
occurring between the present and a near future seem to be likely candidates to fall 
under the purview either of a future-rights-of-future-persons approach, a present-rights-
of-future-persons approach or a present-rights-of-present-persons approach to 
intergenerational justice. 
 Thirdly, specific empirical occurrences prompt different theoretical challenges. 
For instance, depending on the preferred standard, the fact that past generations may not 
have fulfilled the obligations that present persons recognize as binding on all 
generations can affect the extent and nature of intergenerational responsibilities. But the 
most prominent examples relate to demographic fluctuations. In this sense, population 
ethics forces itself into debates on intergenerational justice. Changes in the number of 
members of a community (including the possibility of human extinction as an effect of 
human action) can either provide reasons for altering or for preserving the contents of 
the intergenerational basket, depending on the theory adopted. 
 The best example of such theoretical disparity consists in what came to be 
known as the repugnant conclusion (Parfit 1987): Following a simple aggregative 
standard, for any possible population in which members have a high quality of life, 
there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence would be better 
even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. Scepticism about the 
possibility of a satisfactory population ethics might lead one to embrace this line of 
reasoning (Tännsjö 2002). Most authors, though, tend to believe that such an endeavour 
is counterintuitive, and they often circumvent the repugnant conclusion by rejecting 
aggregative standards in favour of a preferred pattern of distribution of capital and 
welfare. But aggregative standards can still be preserved if additional criteria for 
measuring and counting welfare are taken into account. The principle of optimization 
might balance some kind of proportionality with aggregation in such a way that the 
measured value varies with the number of already existing lives – for instance, by 
increasing value when the number of lives is smaller (Hurka 1983; Ng 1989; Sider 
1991). 
 One of the things that can be inferred from debates on the repugnant conclusion 
is that standards of intergenerational justice are unlikely to be applied to same-number-
of-people choices. This has important consequences to contents such as prohibitions of 





dissavings, given that leaving equal resources to succeeding generations which can be 
twice as numerous actually entails increasing the number of available resources. In 
addition, it involves widening the scope of intergenerational justice beyond the mere 
exercise of thought experiments about the future since actual empirical data need to be 
taken into account when setting the right standards.  
The difficulties inherent in such a task are not only ethical but also political. 
Democratic policies and law-making are actually more concerned with present 
addressees and short-term (often electoral) effects than with the long term, and yet most 
proposals about intergenerational justice seem to rely on democratic instruments of 
implementation (Kates 2015), such as representation (of future generations), for 
instance (Beyleveld et al. 2015). The theoretical challenge is therefore also disciplinary. 
Whereas same-number-of-people choices can be tackled by ideal theories, it seems that 
different-number-of-people choices leave room for non-ideal types of reasoning. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Certain institutions and practical proposals aimed at defending the interests and rights of 
non-present generations are already in play, and this includes the increasing tendency to 
upgrade such rights to the status of constitutional rights or even to consider them part of 
international human rights law (Riley 2016). In addition, the temporal distance between 
some generations increases uncertainty as to the effects of present actions or to the 
nature of future generations’ available resources; the temporal direction of causation 
may generate problems of asymmetry of power across time; the lack of temporal 
coexistence with remote generations is insufficient to remove the interests that present 
persons may have in the interests of future persons. All this is constitutive of a 
problematic to which there should be at least a tentative reply. 
Ultimately, taking the basilar models of the most notorious theories of 
intergenerational justice seriously can be decisive in dealing with problems specific to 
contemporary societies. But the debate is still far from demonstrating that today’s 
societies must embrace a particular theory of intergenerational justice without which 
they cannot be moral (and survive). It will be up to a responsible exercise of citizenship 
to ensure that these arguments are not reduced to inconsequential thought experiments. 
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